Dr. Marc Schröder

  Foto von Dr. Marc Schröder Urheberrecht: © Privat

 

Publikationen

Price of anarchy in congestion games with altruistic/spiteful players
Proceedings of the 13th Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT 2020)
mit V. Ravindran Vijayalakshmi und T. Tamir:
Scheduling games with machine-dependent priority lists
Theoretical Computer Science 2020
mit J. Correa, C. Guzman, T. Lianeas und E. Nikolova:
Network pricing: how to induce optimal flows under strategic link operators
Accepted, Operations Research (2020).

mit V. Ravindran Vijayalakshmi und T. Tamir:
Scheduling Games with Machine-Dependent Priority Lists
Proceedings of the 15th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE 2019).

mit R. Cominetti, M. Scarsini und N. Stier-Moses:
Price of Anarchy in Stochastic Atomic Congestion Games with Affine Costs
Proceedings of the 2019 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC'19).
mit D. Schmand und A. Skopalik:
Network Investment Games with Wardrop Followers
Proceedings of the 46th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2019).
mit T. Harks und D. Vermeulen:
Toll Caps in Privatized Road Networks
European Journal of Operational Research, 276 (3), 947-956 (2019).
mit J. Correa und R. Hoeksma:
Network congestion games are robust to variable demand
Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, 119, pp.69-78 (2019).
mit H. Peters und D. Vermeulen:
Claim Games for Estate Division Problems
Games and Economic Behavior, 116, pp. 105-115 (2019).
mit J. Correa, C. Guzman, T. Lianeas und E. Nikolova:
Network pricing: how to induce optimal flows under strategic link operators
Proceedings of the 19th ACM conference on Economics and Computation (EC’18), pp. 375-392 (2018).
mit H. Peters und D. Vermeulen:
Hotelling's location model with negative network externalities
International Journal of Game Theory, 47 (3), pp. 811-837 (2018).
mit M. Scarsini und T. Tomala:

Dynamic atomic congestion games with seasonal flows
Operations Research, Volume 66 (2), pp. 327-339 (2018).

mit J. Correa und R. Hoeksma:
Network congestion games are robust to variable demand
Proceedings of the 13th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE), p. 397 (2017).

mit J. Flesch und D. Vermeulen:
Implementable and ex-post IR rules in bilateral trading with discrete values
Mathematical Social Sciences 84, pp. 68-75 (2016).

mit H. Peters und D. Vermeulen:
On Existence of ex post Nash consistent representation for effectivity functions
Social Choice and Welfare 45 (2), pp. 287-307 (2015).